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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4162 
___________ 
 
WILLIE L. DAVIS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES E. SAMUELS, JR. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. M.D. Pa. No. 3-14-cv-00821) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 26, 2015 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 30, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
Willie Davis appeals pro se from an order of the District Court dismissing his 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Because we agree with the District Court 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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that Davis failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we will summarily 
affirm. 
I. 
 Davis is currently incarcerated in the special management unit at the United States 
Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.  He filed the civil rights complaint at bar  
against Charles E. Samuels, Jr., Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging 
constitutional violations that arose from prison practices and grievance procedures.  See 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  Specifically, he alleged that prison officials removed mattresses from the cells in 
his unit for 16 hours per day, that he was denied medical treatment for conditions 
(hemorrhoids and body aches) that arose from the removal of the mattresses, and that 
Samuels failed to act favorably on his grievance regarding these issues.  Davis sought 
compensatory and punitive damages. 
 The Magistrate Judge initially recommended that Davis’ claim be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“fails to state a claim on which 
relief may be granted”).  The Magistrate Judge, noting that Davis was proceeding pro se, 
also recommended that Davis be given 20 days to amend his pleading, and the District 
Court adopted the recommendation.  Davis did not amend, and the Magistrate Judge’s 
second report recommended that the District Court dismiss Davis’ case with prejudice “as 
frivolous for failure to state a claim.”  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 
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report, but its dismissal language referenced only § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (“frivolous or 
malicious”).  Davis filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s dismissal of Warner’s complaint under § 1915(e).  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may summarily affirm the District 
Court’s judgment if an appeal presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 
and I.O.P. 10.6.   
III. 
 It is unclear whether the District Court intended to dismiss Davis’ claim under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), as it suggested following the Magistrate Judge’s first report, or under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), as it indicated following the second report.  Davis merely chose not to 
amend his original complaint; he did not alter it in any way.  Moreover, if the District 
Court initially found Davis’ complaint to be frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), it would 
not have needed to grant Davis the opportunity to amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112-13 (3d Cir. 2002)  
 The answer to this question potentially affects our standard of review.  See Ball v. 
Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 462 & n.18 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting the potential of more 
deferential review of §1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals).  Under the circumstances, we will 
treat the District Court’s dismissal as one under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which we review de 
novo.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Geiger v. 
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Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005) (using, in a similar case, the more generous 
standard of review).1 
 The District Court properly dismissed Davis’ complaint.  The legal standard for 
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as 
that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Allah, 229 F.3d at 223.  “To survive a motion to 
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Blanket assertions and 
conclusory statements by themselves do not suffice to show plausibility.  See Renfro v. 
Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 A. Dismissal of the claim against Samuels for acts done by prison personnel 
 We begin with Davis’ claims against Samuels for harm allegedly done on-site by 
prison officials and medical personnel.  Davis did not allege that Samuels himself had 
any involvement in the removal of mattresses from Davis’ unit or in the denial of Davis’ 
medical care, and a civil rights claim cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat 
superior.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-77; Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d 
Cir. 1988).  Davis, who – as we have noted – did not utilize his opportunity to amend his 
                                              
1 We note, of course, that we would reach the same result if we employed a more 
deferential standard.  Regardless of which ground Davis’ claim is dismissed on, it 
appears to constitute a “enumerated strike ground” under § 1915(g), which may affect 
Davis’ ability to bring in forma pauperis claims in the future.  Ball, 726 F.3d at 462.    
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complaint, has also not attempted to sue those directly responsible for the acts described 
in his claim.  His claim must therefore meet the test for supervisory liability that we 
developed in Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).2  See Barkes v. First 
Corr. Med. Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 330 (3d Cir. 2014).3  Here, Davis has not alleged any facts 
suggesting that the practice of removing mattresses during the day created an 
unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation or that Samuels would have been aware of 
any such risk.  The District Court thus correctly held that Davis failed to make a plausible 
claim for relief against Samuels for harms he claims to have suffered at the hands of 
prison officials. 
 B. Dismissal of the claim against Samuels for grievance response 
 Davis’ claim that Samuels should be liable because he did not favorably resolve 
Davis’ grievance also fails.  First, we note that the Constitution does not even require a 
prison to utilize a grievance procedure.  See Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (“[T]he existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on 
a prisoner.”); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991).  Because prisoners have 
                                              
2 Under Sample, “to hold a supervisor liable because his policies or practices led to an 
Eighth Amendment violation, the plaintiff must identify a specific policy or practice that 
the supervisor failed to employ and show that: (1) the existing policy or practice created 
an unreasonable risk of the Eighth Amendment injury; (2) the supervisor was aware that 
the unreasonable risk was created; (3) the supervisor was indifferent to that risk; and (4) 
the injury resulted from the policy or practice.”  Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 
134 (3d Cir. 2001). 
3 Barkes affirmed the continuing viability of the Sample test following the Supreme 
Court’s discussion of supervisory liability in Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676.  See Barkes, 766 
F.3d at 320.   
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no constitutional right to a grievance process, the tenor or existence of Samuels’ response 
did not violate Davis’ constitutional rights.  See Massey, 259 F.3d at 647. 
 Further, as we suggested above, personal involvement is required to find a 
constitutional violation.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-77; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08 
(holding that a plaintiff must establish that the defendants “have personal involvement in 
the alleged wrongs [which] . . . can be shown through allegations of personal direction or 
of actual knowledge and acquiescence”).  Davis does not claim that Samuels personally 
directed any unlawful conduct by on-site officials, but he does appear to claim that, 
because he sent the grievance to Samuels’ office, Samuels knew of and acquiesced in 
their conduct.  This argument fails.  In Rode we held that the filing of a grievance with 
the governor’s office of administration was “simply insufficient” to prove that governor 
had actual knowledge of an alleged action.  Id. at 1208.  In a similar way, merely sending 
an individual grievance about an occurrence in one unit of a single prison to the office of 
Samuels, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, in no way establishes that 
Samuels actually knew about the grievance or acquiesced in the conduct described in it.  
“Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence . . . must be made 
with appropriate particularity.”  Id. at 1207.  Here, Davis has made no attempt to allege 
particular facts leading to the conclusion that Samuels personally knew of or acquiesced 
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in any of the challenged conduct of subordinates.  The District Court was therefore 
correct to dismiss the claim regarding Davis’ grievance.4 
IV. 
 For the reasons given in this opinion, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  
                                              
4 Moreover, because Davis failed to amend his complaint during the District Court 
proceedings, despite being given the opportunity to do so, we agree that the District Court 
was correct to dismiss his claim with prejudice. See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 
F.3d 696, 703 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
